

Top Secret 219

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO.

25X1

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3	HR		
4			

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

25X1

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Saturday 11 March 1978

CG NIDC 78/058C

DIA review(s) completed.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

25X1

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010020-9

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010020-9

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 11 March 1978.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

25X1

CONTENTS

NAMIBIA - SOUTH AFRICA: SWAPO Page 3
USSR-FRANCE: View of Elections Page 5
BRIEFS: Page 6

Morocco
Chile

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

NAMIBIA - SOUTH AFRICA: SWAPO

25X1 [] There are growing signs of divergence between the leadership of the South-West Africa People's Organization inside Namibia and Sam Nujoma, the group's exiled leader. Nujoma has said SWAPO will seize power by armed force, but SWAPO leaders in Namibia appear to be planning to contest the preindependence election. South African Prime Minister Vorster apparently hopes to focus international attention on SWAPO's militants and thus move the Western contact group toward acceptance of a stronger South African residual force than the present settlement package allows.

25X1 [] South African leaders are citing Nujoma's interview with South African television in New York last month as proof that the nationalist movement is not interested in a peaceful solution for Namibia. Nujoma said, "We are not fighting for majority rule. We are fighting to seize power in Namibia for the benefit of the Namibian people."

25X1 [] South African television has repeatedly shown Nujoma's interview, and Vorster has publicly challenged the Western contact group to denounce Nujoma's statement. Foreign Minister Botha has also cited Nujoma's statement and asserted that SWAPO agents instigated the recent rioting in Windhoek. He said this might require South Africa to reinforce--rather than partially withdraw--its troops and police in Namibia.

25X1 [] Botha urged the Western contact group to reconsider its approach to the Namibia problem and to complete its settlement package "within a few days." In discussing tentative revisions of the Western package, however, the South Africans have shown enough flexibility to keep the talks going.

25X1 [] Nujoma's remarks have also caused some problems for the leaders of SWAPO's internal wing, which is allowed to operate legally inside Namibia. The South African - supported Democratic Turnhalle Alliance has declared that SWAPO's internal

wing should not be allowed to compete in the election unless it repudiates Nujoma's leadership. In a press conference called by the internal leadership, SWAPO's information secretary said he suspected Nujoma's remarks were reported out of context because they contradict official SWAPO policy.

25X1 [] The information secretary also released a statement giving the views of the internal leadership on SWAPO's talks last month with the Western contact group in New York. The statement is consistent with the position taken in New York, although it takes a more positive line on the prospects of resolving the remaining issues. The internal leadership said it would not oppose releasing disaffected SWAPO leader Andreas Shipanga and 10 of his supporters who are now being detained in Tanzania and appeared flexible about the location of a residual South African military force and the size of a UN military contingent.

25X1 [] There have been other signs that SWAPO's internal leaders are trying to be more accommodating. In an unprecedented action, they agreed this week to sit down at the same table with representatives of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and other groups to discuss how to curb rising political violence, which has resulted in at least 15 deaths and over 100 injuries this month. They decided to create a "watchdog committee" of representatives of SWAPO, the Turnhalle Alliance, another political alliance, and the church to monitor pre-election activities and to try to forestall further violence.

25X1

USSR-FRANCE: View of Elections

25X1

[] The USSR appears cool toward the prospect of a left-ist victory in the French election. Publicly, the Soviets have hinted they are less than enthusiastic about a Communist-Socialist majority in the National Assembly, an impression that is reinforced by the private remarks of Soviet officials.

25X1

[] One of the clearest public expositions of Soviet views appeared in the foreign policy weekly *Za Rubezhom* earlier this month. The article was noteworthy for its relatively hostile treatment of the French Socialists, who would dominate a government of the Left.

25X1

[] The article charged that the Socialist Party has long supported "the US line" on foreign policy questions, attacked its close relations with the West German Social Democrats, and went on to suggest that the party's membership in the Socialist International placed in question its commitment to cooperation with the Communists and to detente with the Soviet Union and other Communist states.

25X1

[] The article also implicitly criticized the French Communists by referring to their willingness to accept continued French cooperation with NATO and membership in the EC. Both positions come very close to the "compromises of principle" the Soviets have previously called unacceptable.

25X1

[] In striking contrast to its open criticism of the Socialists and seeming coolness toward the Communists, the article had high praise for President Giscard and even more for the Gaullists. It hailed the French Government for continuing an "independent foreign policy line," and praised the Gaullists for their "policy of national independence" and support for a policy of "harmony and cooperation with the Soviet Union."

25X1

[] The Soviets have been more candid in private. A Soviet Army attache told a US colleague late last month that he did not expect nor want the Left to win and said that the French Communists were incapable of governing France at this time. A few days earlier, the Soviet defense attache expressed similar sentiments to a group of French Air Force officers. He said the right is a "known quantity," and the Soviets "cannot tell what will happen if the Left wins."

25X1

25X1

[] In spite of their qualms, the Soviets are likely to make their peace quickly with the new majority if the Left emerges triumphant. They will try to minimize their own differences with the French Communists and the Socialists, and at the same time will attempt to move them in directions favorable to Soviet interests. []

25X1

BRIEFS

Morocco

25X1

[] The USSR yesterday signed an agreement with Morocco to provide \$2 billion in 20-year credits to help develop Morocco's Meskala phosphate deposits. The Soviets will receive 10 million tons of phosphate rock annually for 30 years in repayment of the credits and in exchange for Soviet goods. The agreement will be reviewed every five years. The total value of trade and credit transactions could eventually rise to \$10 billion.

25X1

[] Negotiations on the Meskala project dragged on for four years.

25X1

[] Morocco and the USSR signed an agreement in February on fisheries after several years of negotiation. In return for access to Moroccan waters, the Soviets will provide Morocco with fishing trawlers, aid in the construction of a fish processing center, and train Moroccan personnel. []

25X1

Chile

25X1

[] Chilean President Pinochet's decision to revoke the state of siege seems intended to soften a new resolution on Chile now under consideration by the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva and possibly to counteract the damaging implications of the Letelier murder case.

25X1

[] The reduction to a state of emergency will remove several of the government's powers including exile by executive fiat, detention without charge for more than five days, and revoking citizenship. The government will still have wide latitude to restrict trade union activity, political meetings, and free expression.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Pinochet also promised there would be no further trials of "a military nature." Until the complex patchwork of existing decrees is replaced by a new code, however, it is unclear where the lines of civil and military justice will be drawn. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

Top Secret

(Security Classification)